


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X.509 certificate validation

- for SSL/TLS, validating the certificate's name and signature by the browser is absolutely crucial
 - browsers validate the chain against a built-in set of root certificates by verifying the signatures, and *must* make sure that the name is matching (would be vulnerable to MiTM otherwise)
- for the SAML world and the SWITCHaai federation, certificates are fully embedded in the federation metadata, and only the public key is considered by Shibboleth (X.509 is used as a convenient container format)

- name and signature are basically thrown away

SWITCHaai requirements for SAML embedded certificates

- either a self-signed certificate with minimal subject information and X.509v3 extensions (recommended, can be created with the keygen script bundled with the Shibboleth SP)
- or a certificate signed by a well-known CA, with organization validation (OV), chaining to a root trusted by either Microsoft or Mozilla
- further reading:
 - https://www.switch.ch/aai/support/certificate-acceptance.html
 - https://www.switch.ch/aai/support/embeddedcerts-requirements.html

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