Shibboleth v0.7 has some limitations and lacks certain security provisions which will be present in the final version. It is strongly advised that this version not be used to protect any sensitive data. Some sections of the deploy guide have not yet been populated with text. This document describes additional functionality which will be present in the final version, but which is not implemented in the v0.7, including but not limited to:
Some security features, including authentication of SHARs, and support for non-trivial certificate validation processes beyond simple CA validation.
Bundling of SSO or WebISO systems.
Any support for customized target side AAP's, except by writing an Apache module to implement the desired policy. As shipped, EPPN and eduPersonAffiliation are only accepted from the AA if the scope value is equal to the value of "domain" in the origin site HS's web.xml file, which will be the same as the name provided in registration with Club Shib.
Club Shib is only a rudimentary concept at this time, and no support for multiple clubs or club policies is provided. Registration with the Shibboleth project management team is required to interoperate with other test sites, unless peer to peer sharing of certificate information is undertaken. For more information about acquiring certificates accepted by Club Shib, please refer to section 2.d.
Functionality which has been added since the previous version (alpha-2.5) includes:
Before starting, please sign up for all applicable mailing lists. Announcements pertinent to Shibboleth deployments and developments and resources for deployment assistance can be found here.
Please send any questions, concerns, or eventual confusion to mace-shib-users@internet2.edu. This should include, but not be limited to, questions about the documentation, undocumented problems, installation or operational issues, and anything else that arises. Please ensure that you have the appropriate .tarball for your operating system. Thank you for your help in testing Shibboleth.
Before proceeding with any installation of, implementation of, or any other use of Shibboleth or its code, read and agree to the usage terms put forth in the LICENSE file included in the tarballs. Note that Shibboleth is based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), a proposed standard in the OASIS organization. There are intellectual property claims on SAML technology that are published on the OASIS site. Shibboleth deployers are encouraged to evaluate these claims and respond to them as they see fit.
Shibboleth is a system designed to exchange attributes across realms for the primary purpose of authorization. It provides a secure framework for one organization to transmit attributes about a web-browsing individual across security domains to another institution. In the primary usage case, when a user attempts to access a resource at a remote domain, the user's own home security domain can send certain information about that user to the target site in a trusted exchange. These attributes can then be used by the resource to help determine whether to grant the user access to the resource. The user may have the ability to decide whether to release specific attributes to certain sites by specifying personal Attribute Release Policies (ARP's), effectively preserving privacy while still granting access based on trusted information.
When a user first tries to access a resource protected by Shibboleth, they are redirected to a service which asks the user to specify the organization from which they want to authenticate. If the user has not yet locally authenticated to a WebISO service, the user will then be redirected to their home institution's authentication system. After the user authenticates, the Shibboleth components at the local institution will generate a temporary reference to the user, known as a handle, for the individual and send this to the target site. The target site can then use the handle to ask for attributes about this individual. Based on these attributes, the target can decide whether or not to grant access to the resource. The user may then be allowed to access the requested materials.
There are several controls on privacy in Shibboleth, and mechanisms are provided to allow users to determine exactly which information about them is released. A user's actual identity isn't necessary for many access control decisions, so privacy often is needlessly compromised. Instead, the resource often utilizes other attributes that are after they are associated with an identity, such as faculty member or member of a certain class. Shibboleth provides a way to mutually refer to the same principal without revealing that principal's identity. Because the user is initially known to the target site only by a randomly generated temporary handle, if sufficient, the target site might know no more about the user than that the user is a member of the origin organization. This handle should never be used to decide whether or not to grant access, and is intended only as a temporary reference for requesting attributes.
There are four primary components to the origin side in Shibboleth: the Attribute Authority (AA), the Handle Service (HS), the directory service, and the local sign-on system (SSO). The AA and HS are provided with Shibboleth, and an open-source WebISO solution produced by the University of Washington known as Pubcookie is also supplied; the directory is provided by the origin site. Shibboleth is able to interface with a directory exporting an LDAP interface or a SQL database containing user attributes, and is designed such that programming interfaces to other repositories should be readily implemented. Shibboleth relies on standard web server mechanisms to trigger local authentication. A .htaccess file can be easily used to trigger either the local WebISO system or the web server's own Basic Auth mechanism, which will likely utilize an enterprise authentication system, such as Kerberos.
From the origin site's point of view, the first contact will be the redirection of a user to the handle service, which will then consult the SSO system to determine whether the user has already been authenticated. If not, then the browser user will be asked to authenticate, and then sent back to the target URL with a handle bundled in an attribute assertion. Next, a request from the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR) will arrive at the AA which will include the previously mentioned handle. The AA then consults the ARP's for the directory entry corresponding to the handle, queries the directory for these attributes, and releases to the SHAR all attributes the SHAR is entitled to know about that user.
There are three primary components to the target side in Shibboleth: the Shibboleth Indexical Reference Establisher (SHIRE), the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR), and the resource manager (RM). An implementation of each of these is included in the standard Shibboleth distribution. These components are intended to run on the same web server.
From the target's point of view, a browser will hit the RM with a request for a Shibboleth-protected resource. The RM then allows the SHIRE to step in, which will use the WAYF to acquire the name of a handle service to ask about the user. The handle service (HS) will then reply with a SAML authentication assertion containing a handle, which the SHIRE then hands off to the SHAR. The SHAR uses the handle and the supplied address of the corresponding attribute authority (AA) to request all attributes it is allowed to know about the handle. The SHAR performs some basic validation and analysis based on attribute acceptance policies (AAP's). These attributes are then handed off to the RM, which is responsible for using these attributes to decide whether to grant access.
The WAYF service can be either outsourced and operated by a club or deployed as part of the SHIRE. It is responsible for allowing a user to associate themself with an institution of their specification, then redirecting the user to the known address for the handle service of that institution.
A Shibboleth club provides part of the underlying trust required for function of the Shibboleth architecture. A club is a group of organizations(universities, corporations, content providers, etc.) who agree to exchange attributes using the SAML/Shibboleth protocols and abide by a common set of policies and practices. In so doing, they must implicitly or explicitly agree to a common set of guidelines. Joining a club is not explicitly necessary for operation of Shibboleth, but it dramatically expands the number of targets and origins that can interact without defining bilateral agreements between all these parties.
A club can be created in a variety of formats and trust models, but must provide a certain set of services to club members. It needs to supply a registry to process applications to the club and distribute membership information to the origin and target sites. This must include distribution of the PKI components necessary for trust between origins and targets. There also needs to be a set of agreements and best practices defined by the club governing the exchange, use, and population of attributes before and after transit, and there should be a way to find information on local authentication and authorization practices for club members.
There are several essential elements that must be present in the environment to ensure Shibboleth functions well, both political and technical. Shibboleth is primarily written in Java on the origin side. These are the recommendations and requirements for a successful Shibboleth implementation.
A common institutional directory service should be operational; Shibboleth comes with LDAP and MySQL abilities built in, and the Attribute Authority has a Java API which will allow specification of interfaces with legacy directories. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.
A method to authenticate browser users must be in place, preferably in the form of an enterprise authentication service. Some form of an SSO or a WebISO service is not explicitly necessary for Shibboleth; however, without it, users will have to repeatedly authenticate to the home organization for each new target application domain they wish to visit. Implementation details of this are discussed in 4.c.
Shibboleth currently only supports Linux and Solaris.
A web server must be deployed that can host Java servlets, Tomcat, and optionally a MySQL database(which may or may not be on the same server as the Shibboleth components).
While it is not necessary for a target or origin to join a club, doing so greatly facilitates the implementation of multilateral trust relationships. Each club will have a different application process.
To join Club Shib for the Alpha 2 test period, please submit a basic application to shib-support@internet2.edu containing the following information:
- Domain Name of the origin site (e.g., Ohio State's is "osu.edu")
- Complete URL to access the HS
- The CN (usually the hostname) of the HS's certificate's subject
- Any shorthand aliases the WAYF should support for the origin site (e.g., Ohio State, OSU, Buckeyes)
- Club contact names and addresses
To interoperate with other sites in Club Shib, the HS will need to have a private key and associated certificate generated. When generating the certificate, the subject field will contain a CN attribute. Often, this will be the hostname of your Handle Service, particularly if the same key-pair and certificate will be used for SSL as well. While any name may be assigned that is acceptible to the signer of your certificate, using the hostname is strongly encouraged.
If, for some reason, the HS's URL is not yet known, but its hostname and CN have been determined, the URL may be supplied later. In the meantime, the WAYF will be unable to direct users to that HS, but any assertions from the site will still be accepted by club SHIRE's. When the site is accepted into the Club, its information is added to the sites file used by the WAYF and target sites.
For more information on Clubs, refer to 1.d or the Shibboleth v1.0 architectural document.
Shibboleth's protocols and software have been extensively engineered to provide protection against many attacks. However, the most secure protocol can be compromised if it is placed in an insecure environment. To ensure Shibboleth is as secure as possible, there are several recommended security precautions which should be in place at local sites.
SSL use is optional for origin sites. Club guidelines should be considered when determining whether to implement SSL, and, in general, SSL should be used for interactions with client machines to provide the necessary authentication and encryption to ensure protection from man-in-the-middle attacks. It is strongly suggested that all password traffic or similarly sensitive data should be SSL-protected. Assessment of the risk tradeoff against possible performance degradation should be performed for all applications.
Many other attacks can be made on the several redirection steps that Shibboleth takes to complete attribute transfer. The best protection against this is safeguarding the WAYF service and ensuring that rogue targets and origins are not used, generally by development of the trust model underneath Shibboleth. Shibboleth also leverages DNS for security, which is not uncommon, but attacks concerning bad domain information should be considered.
Information regarding origin users is generally provided by the authoritative enterprise directory, and the acceptance of requests from target applications can be carefully restricted to ensure that all requests the SHAR performs are authorized and all information the origin provides is accurate. Proper security measures should also be in place on directory access and population(see Access Control in the LDAP recipe for more information). Use of plaintext passwords is strongly advised against.
Server platforms should be properly secured, commensurate with the level that would be expected for a campus' other security services, and cookie stores on client machines should be well protected.
In the Shibboleth architecture, the SHIRE, SHAR, HS, and AA must all have various client and/or server certificates for use in signing assertions and creating SSL channels. These should be issued by a commonly accepted CA, which may be stipulated by some Club rules. For the Shibboleth Alpha 2 testing, the following CA's will be recognized by Club Shib:
- Verisign/RSA Secure Server CA
- CREN CA
- CREN Web Server CA
- EuroPKI CA
- Microsoft Test CA *
- University of Wisconsin Bossie Test CA *
* The certificates issued by these CA's will expire fairly quickly and should only be used for testing.
OSU will also provide a test CA to be used during Shibboleth development. Thawte presently issues certificates with extKeyUsage restrictions that make them incompatible with Shibboleth.
The Attribute Authority maintains a set of rules called Attribute Release Policies (ARP's) that define which attributes are released to which targets. When a browser user tries to access a resource, the SHAR asks the origin site AA to release all the attributes it is allowed to know. The SHAR provides its own name and an optional URL which can further refine the information the SHAR is allowed to know. The AA processes this request using all applicable ARP's, determines which attributes and values it will release, and then obtains the values actually associated with the browser user. The AA sends these attributes and values back to the SHAR.
The set of ARP's that is applicable to a given request is determined by first matching the SHAR name against the ARP's. After one or more matching ARP's are found, the AA searches the URL trees pertaining to those ARP's. The closest matches are selected, and an appropriate list of attributes is evaluated combining the applicable ARP's with the attribute generation methods, usually querying the enterprise directory and applying the appropriate logic and packaging.
An ARP may be thought of as a sort of filter for outbound attributes; it cannot create attributes or data that weren't originally present, but it can limit the attributes released and the values those attributes may have when released. It does not change the information in the data sources in any way.
This information is then sent to the requesting SHAR. Although an arbitrary number of ARP's may be defined for an arbitrary number of SHAR's and URL trees within SHAR's, only the most precisely matching ARP is considered a match, and then used to determine the release of information to a target site. If no SHAR matches the query, the default set of attributes as defined by the AA will be released.
A special type of ARP is the site ARP, which applies to every user that an AA can vouch for, as opposed to user ARP's, which apply only to the pertinent user. Site ARP's are administratively created and maintained, with one set of site ARP's defined for a given AA. If both a site ARP and a user ARP are applicable to a particular SHAR/URL combination, then the attributes released are the union of the two ARP's necessarily excluding any attributes marked exclude and necessarily including any attributes marked include.
Site ARP's are formed in much the same way as user ARP's, with a couple noteworthy differences. Site ARP's may force the release of attributes or particular values to particular SHAR/URL combinations, and may also prohibit the release of attributes or particular values to particular SHAR/URL combinations. The other primary role of the site ARP is to define a default release policy that applies to all SHAR's that do not have an entry in either the applicable site ARP's or user ARP's. For privacy and security reasons, the default policy will generally be fairly restrictive. Site ARP's give administrators very powerful ways to apply trust relationships with information providers and other targets across an entire user base.
Since Shibboleth deals both with daily technical and operational issues and also with contractual issues, a set of contacts should be set up to support the user base and to facilitate interactions with other Shibboleth sites and club members. It is recommended that at least technical and administrative contacts be designated.
A primary Shibboleth design consideration was to require very little or no modification to client machines. The only requirement is that a browser is used which supports cookies, redirection and SSL. Browser users will have to perform an additional click to submit the authentication assertion if JavaScript is not functional.
NTP should be run on all web servers. Shibboleth employs a short handle issuance time to protect against replay attacks. Because of this, any significant degree of clock skew can hinder the ability of users to access sites successfully.
Especially for higher education, there are a handful of laws enacted which may have important ramifications on the disclosure of personal information and attributes. Since Shibboleth does not necessarily need to transmit identity, it is an ideal solution for many higher education situations. Nevertheless, all parties within the United States of America are strongly advised to consult the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974(FERPA), and all other relevant state and federal legislation before deploying Shibboleth.
- Apache 1.3.26+
- Apache Ant 1.5+
- Tomcat 3.3.1 Java server
- Sun JRE 1.3.1 (any subversion)
Other versions of the JRE are not supported and are known to cause errors when working with certificates.
- mod_jk
You may need to build mod_jk against Apache, which will generally require GCC or a platform-specific C compiler.
- An enterprise authentication mechanism
Ideally, this will be a WebISO or SSO system such as the University of Washington's Pubcookie package. The minimal requirement is for the web server to be able to authenticate browser users and supply their identity to the Handle Server.
- An enterprise directory service
Shibboleth currently supports retrieving user attribute information from either LDAP or MySQL. For testing purposes, Shibboleth also supports a minimal echo responder which will always return two pre-defined attributes.
The origin can be built using a MySQL database to store handles or an in-memory method to store handles. Additionally, it's possible to define alternate storage methods using the API. (optional)
Ensure you have already obtained the proper .tarball.
The archive will expand into a shib/ directory(/usr/local/ recommended).
Run the following command to move the Java files into Tomcat's tree:
cp /usr/local/shib/java/shibboleth.war /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/Restart Tomcat, which will automatically detect that there has been a new .war file added. This file will by default be expanded into /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth.
Apache must be told to map the URL's for the Shibboleth HS and AA to Tomcat. Two popular ways of doing this are to include the following text directly in httpd.conf, or to place Include conf/mod_jk.conf in httpd.conf, and place the following lines in /etc/httpd/conf/mod_jk.conf:
--------- begin ---------
<IfModule !mod_jk.c>
LoadModule jk_module libexec/mod_jk.so
</IfModule>
JkWorkersFile "/usr/local/tomcat/conf/jk/workers.properties"
JkLogFile "/usr/local/apache/logs/mod_jk.log"
JkLogLevel emerg
JkMount /shibboleth/* ajp13
--------- end ---------Modify Tomcat's /conf/server.xml as follows:
Add address="127.0.0.1" inside the <Ajp12Connector> and <Ajp13Connector> configuration elements to prevent off-host access.
Add tomcatAuthentication="false" to the <Ajp13Connector> configuration element to ensure that the user's identity is passed from Apache to the servlet environment.
A MySQL database needs to be implemented along with a JDBC driver MM.MySQL such as for use by the HS. The driver selected should be unpacked and the .jar file should be moved to /usr/local/tomcat/lib/apps/.
Using /usr/local/shib/etc/shibdump.sql, a MySQL database must be created. Copy this file where desired. The default access for Shibboleth to the database is shib/shib. This can and should be changed for security purposes in both the database itself and web.xml.
As admin, run mysql < shibdump.sql; this may be done locally or on another machine.
The main configuration file for Shibboleth's origin side is located in /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth/WEB-INF/web.xml. This file contains configuration information for the origin side in several sections. The first is a set of options that must be defined outside the servlet configuration, followed by configuration information for the HS and the AA. The configuration must be consistent with values elsewhere in the deployment, such as the HS' certificate and with directory access usr/pwd, etc., or access errors will occur. These are the variables that may be specified for each component of web.xml:
repository = <type> This option must be specified outside the servlet description, and specifies the method used to store handles. The two currently valid values are SQL and MEMORY.
MySQL(optional -- These values must be populated outside the servlet description if repository = SQL):
DBdriver = <driver name> This is the name of the driver that the HS should use in queries to the MySQL database. For MM.MySQL, this should be org.gjt.mm.mysql.Driver.
DBuser = <login> This is the username used to login to the MySQL database, and must be consistent with one defined in the database.
DBpass = <password> This is the password used to login to the MySQL database, and must be consistent with one defined in the database.
DBdomain = <domain> Specifies the location of the MySQL server. Localhost cannot be used as a value due to processing by the Tomcat server; even if the database is hosted locally, the FQDN must be used.
HS:
domain = <domain name> Specifies the domain in which the HS is located, e.g. internet2.edu. Used to populate the Subject NameQualifier in issued attribute assertions.
HSname = <domain name> Specifies the machine on which the HS is located, e.g. shib.internet2.edu
ticket = <milliseconds> Specifies the duration in milliseconds for which an issued attribute assertion should be valid; defaults to 1400000. Refer to club guidelines for advice in populating this field.
AAurl = <url> Defines the URL where the AA runs, such as https://shib.internet2.edu/shibboleth/AA.
KSpath = <pathname> Defines the pathname to the JKS keystore that is used by the HS. The effective root of this path is /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth and the keystore should usually be placed in WEB-INF/conf(Defaults to /WEB-INF/conf/keystore.jks)
KSpass = <password> Specifies the password used to access the JKS keystore.
KSkeyalias = <alias> Specifies the alias used to access the HS's private key entry within the keystore.
KSkeypass = <password> Specifies the password used to access the HS's private key entry within the keystore.
certalias = <alias> This is the alias used to access the certificate associated with the key used by the HS within the keystore. Should be identical to KSkeyalias.
username = <HTTP Request Header> Specifies the CGI header to pull username from when assigning handles. If omitted, REMOTE_USER is assumed.
AA:
domain = <domain name> Specifies the domain in which the AA is located, e.g. internet2.edu. This is the default scope for attributes.
arpFactoryMethod = <method> This will eventually allow for the selection of how ARP's are stored, supporting SQL databases and LDAP repositories. Currently, file is the only method supported.
ctxFactoryClass = <parameter> This optional parameter allows sites to override how AA will populate attribute assertions. This is only needed if LDAP is not used.
An echo setting is provided for testing by specifying the parameter edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.aaLocal.EchoCtxFactory which will automatically return eduPersonAffiliation=member and eduPersonPrincipalName populated with the UID used to login the user in question.
LDAP(optional -- These values must be provided if LDAP is used(e.g. ctxFactoryClass not specified)):
dirUrl = <LDAP URL> This is the URL of the LDAP directory from which Shibboleth should retrieve user attributes. It should contain the LDAP hostname and search base. An example query URL would be ldap://shib2.internet2.edu/ou=People,dc=internet2,dc=edu
ctxPrincipal = <DN> This optional parameter allows for specification of the DN to be used if you want the HS to BIND to the LDAP server before issuing the query.
ctxCredentials = <password> This parameter defines the password used for the LDAP BIND. Must be specified if ctxPrincipal is populated.
ldapUserDnPhrase = <DC> This is the prefix for the last part of the DN; e.g., uid=. The user's ID is dynamically appended to this value to create the user's complete DN. Note that if username is not part of the LDAP DN, a customized ctxFactoryClass must be built and used for LDAP to work. Additionally, %s may be specified as part of <DC>; if %s is specified, it will be replaced with the user's ID and is used as an LDAP search filter. The query must return exactly one entry.
The SAML messages generated by the HS must be digitally signed. Each HS must be issued a private and public keypair, which is stored in a Java keystore. The current implementation of Shibboleth requires the use of an ordinary file-based keystore. The keytool program is included with the Java development and runtime kits. Access parameters to the keystore will need to be consistent with those specified in web.xml.
A sample keystore that can be used is included in the distribution and can be found in /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth/WEB-INF/conf/keystore.jks with a password of shibhs.
The following commands will generate a new RSA keypair and store it in the keystore.jks file, with a keyentry alias of hs and new passwords of your choosing:
$ cd /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth/WEB-INF/conf
$ keytool -storepasswd -keystore keystore.jks -new <newpassword>
$ keytool -genkey -keystore keystore.jks -alias hs -keyalg rsa -keysize 2048
You will be prompted for passwords during key generation as needed, to access the keystore and assign the key itself its own password. You will also be prompted for the distinguished name components to associate with the key. This DN will be placed in a self-signed certificate and will be the name that is associated with your HS by Shibboleth. In particular, the first component you enter for Name will be the Common Name(when keytool asks for first and last name, common name is intended), which in most cases should be the hostname of the HS system. Note that a specific club of sites may dictate what type of key algorithm, key size, or validity period is appropriate. For Club Shib, RSA should be used with a minimum keysize of 2048 bits.
Once you have a keypair generated, the self-signed certificate must be replaced with a certificate signed by a CA acceptable to the club you will be joining. If your certificate is signed by an intermediate CA, such as a campus CA which has been signed by CREN, the trust will fail unless the intermediate CA is recognized as a trusted root by club members as well as the superior CA. This restriction may change in subsequent releases.
To generate a certificate signing request for a CA, use the following command:
$ keytool -certreq -keystore keystore.jks -alias hs -file <csr-file>
The contents of <csr-file> can then be sent to a CA for signing. You will receive a signed certificate in return in a file. To install the new certificate into your keystore, use the following command:
$ keytool -import -keystore keystore.jks -alias hs -file <cert-file>Note that if the signing CA's certificate is not already installed in your keystore as a trusted signer, you may need to download the CA's root certificate and import it into the keystore file under a different alias, using a command similar to the above.
The JDK includes the command line program keytool for managing Java keystores. This utility cannot import or export private key information, making it difficult to use the same private key and certificate for Apache and Java-based applications. The Shibboleth distribution includes extkeytool, a program that can be used in conjunction with keytool to perform these tasks. Select the appropriate step-by-step procedure for your situation from the following guides.
If you have a pre-exiting RSA key/certificate combination in a keystore and you would like to use it with Apache:
Determine the alias of the keystore keyEntry containing the key you would like to use in your Apache setup. Assuming that your keystore is named yourstore, the following command should present a list of the entries in the keystore.
$ keytool -list -v -keystore yourstore
Assuming that you identified the appropriate alias as youralias and the password for the keystore is yourpass, enter the following command to export the key in Base64-encoded pkcs8 format.
$ extkeytool -exportkey -keystore yourstore -alias youralias -storepass yourpass -rfc -file yourkey.pkcs8
In order to use this key with Apache, you must convert it to PEM-encoded RSA native format. You have the option of storing the key unencrypted or encrypted:
To use the unencrypted format, enter the following command for the conversion:
$ openssl pkcs8 -in yourkey.pkcs8 -nocrypt|openssl rsa -out yourkey.key
To use the encrypted format, enter the following command for the conversion:
$ openssl pkcs8 -in yourkey.pkcs8 -nocrypt|openssl rsa -des3 -out yourkey.enckey
The following command will export the corresponding certificate.
$ keytool -export -keystore yourstore -alias youralias -rfc -file yourcert
Set the mod_ssl SSLCertificateKeyFile and SSLCertificateFile directives to point to the two files you have just created. Take care to remove any temporary files you created (i.e. yourkey.pkcs8) and set appropriate file permissions, especially if you chose to store the key in an unencrypted format.
If you have a pre-existing RSA key/certificate combination that you use with Apache and would like to import it into a java keystore:
Convert the private key to unencrypted DER-encoded pkcs8 format. Assuming your PEM-encoded key is stored in a file named yourkey.enckey, enter the following command.
$ openssl pkcs8 -in yourkey.enckey -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER -out yourkey.der.pkcs8
Create a certificate bundle file. This file should include a series of PEM-encoded X509 certificates representing a complete trust chain, from the root CA certificate to the certificate that matches your private key. If your certificate is stored in a file named mycert and the CA signer certificate is stored in a file named ca.cert, you might enter the following command to create the bundle.
$ cat mycert ca.cert > cert.bundle
Note: mod_ssl-enabled Apache installations include a number of commonly recognized CA certificates in the ca-bundle.crt file under the $ServerRoot/conf/ssl.crt/ directory.
Import the key and certificate into the keystore. Assuming you have already created a keystore named yourstore with a password of of yourpass, enter the following command to store the data under the alias youralias.
$ ./extkeytool -importkey -keystore yourstore -alias youralias -storepass yourpass -keyfile yourkey.der.pkcs8 -certfile cert.bundle -provider org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider
You can verify that the import was successful by listing entry. Use the command below.
$ keytool -list -v -keystore yourstore -alias youralias
Remember to delete yourkey.der.pkcs8, as it contains your unencrypted private key.
If you are starting from scratch and do not yet have a certificate/key pair:
Generate an RSA private key. Use the command below, substituting yourkey with an appropriate name to use to refer to the key.
$ openssl genrsa -des3 -out yourkey.enckey 1024
The following command generates a Certificate Signing Request, which should be communicated to a Certificate Authority.
$ openssl req -new -key yourkey.enckey
The Certificate Authority should respond with a PEM-encoded X509 certificate. Set the mod_ssl SSLCertificateKeyFile directive to point to the key file you just created and the SSLCertificateFile directive to point to file containing the certificate issued by the Certificate Authority. Previous sections explaion how to share the key/certificate pair with a Java keystore.
The interaction between the HS and the local authentication system is implemented by supplying the HS with the identity of the browser user. Most often, this will mean protecting the HS servlet with some form of local authentication that populates REMOTE_USER, or another header specified to the HS via web.xml. Location blocks can be added to httpd.conf, associating the appropriate authentication mechanism with the URL of the HS servlet. The following example demonstrates association of a very basic authentication method with the HS:
<Location /shibboleth/HS>
AuthType Basic
AuthName "Internet2 Handle Service"
AuthUserFile /usr/local/apache/conf/user.db
require valid-user
</Location>
Note that .htaccess files cannot be used for this purpose because URL's are "virtualized" by Tomcat.
It is recommended that the origin be tested at the end of this process using the process described in section 6.a.
Under development and extremely likely to fluctuate with future implementation.
An ARP determines which attributes are released to a SHAR when a user tries to access a resource. Because of the architecture of the Shibboleth protocols, the requesting SHAR is the component that must be considered first when evaluating which ARP to use. After the requesting SHAR has been identified, the URL trees defined for that SHAR are considered, from which the best match is selected and the specified attributes are released. The data sources for the AA are authoritative and information they do not contain cannot be created by use of ARP's in any way.
ARP's can be defined either on a site-wide basis or for individual users. Although an arbitrary number of ARP's may be defined for an arbitrary number of SHAR's and URL trees within SHAR's, only the most precisely matching ARP is used determine the release of information to a target site. Domain names are processed first in reverse component order, followed by the processing of the rest of the URL in normal order. * is a valid wildcard and all ARP's are assumed to terminate in a *. Filters can also be constructed to screen attributes before release to pull out site-specific information, or release only specific parts of given attributes.
Site ARP's are defined differently, and only one set of site ARP's can be defined for a given AA. Several special types of ARP may be defined in the site policy. One default ARP for any SHAR or URL that is not matched may be formed. The release of certain attributes to certain targets may be marked exclude, which disallows the release of that attribute, even if the user tries to specify it for themself. Similarly, certain attributes to certain targets may be marked include, which disallows the user from denying the release of that attribute. Filters are evaluated for both includes and excludes, which screen the released attributes. A filtered include for a value that a user does not have will not force the release of that value. If both a site ARP and a user ARP are applicable to a particular SHAR/URL combination, then the attributes released are the union of the two ARP's necessarily excluding any attributes marked exclude and necessarily including any attributes marked include.
A set of default ARP's should be established for the community. When Shibboleth is installed, there are no defined ARP's, and therefore, nothing will ever be released. This must be modified using either the text-based editor or the MyAA webapp. Since these settings will govern the privacy of your users, site ARP's should be defined carefully before any sensitive information is utilized, and users should be informed of their reponsibility to regulate the release of sensitive information.
Management of ARP's may be delegated to other users to allow for distributed editing. Each component of each ARP -- SHAR, URL, and attribute -- may be given an ACL. Users listed in the ACL will be granted the ability to modify that particular ARP object and create additional ARP objects further down the ARP tree: the manager of a SHAR ARP could add new URL trees, but the manager of a URL tree could not add new URL trees within the SHAR. Control of an ARP object grants the ability to modify any component on the ARP tree beneath that object.
For more precise information regarding how ARP's are processed or syntactically formed, please refer to section 5.a.i.
MyAA is a web-based tool for the management of ARP's. It is intended primarily for users who want to expand the default ARP's to handle special needs and applications, or impose stricter privacy parameters. MyAA's web interface should be configured and placed as appropriate for your institution. Users should be made aware of how to best use the tool for their requirements. Please refer to section 5.a.iv for technical information.
This section applies primarily to the syntactic and technical details of ARP's. For basic information on and explanation of the construction of ARP's, processing logic, and ARP management, please refer to section 4.e.
ARP's are stored in the form of several objects: ARP, ARP:SHAR, ARP:RESOURCE, and ARP:ATTR. Each of these objects has an associated ACL which defines the set of users who can define and modify that object and its subordinate objects; for example, if user parviz is in the ACL of an ARP:SHAR of shar.osu.edu, then parviz has the permission to create a new ARP:RESOURCE object hanging from the shar.osu.edu ARP:SHAR object. This allows for delegated management of ARP's.
The site ARP must be formed for the ARP user admin; ARP's for other users are applicable only to attribute release requests based on that user. If both a site ARP and a user ARP are applicable to a particular SHAR/URL combination, then the attributes released are the union of the two ARP's necessarily excluding any attributes marked exclude and necessarily including any attributes marked include. ARP's may be managed both using the ArpUtil tool, and the MyAA web interface.
Following is an example of a site ARP. The SHAR no.other.match is defined as the default SHAR, must have a URL tree of *, and there must be only one present in any valid site ARP; defaults must not be used in user ARP's. This SHAR is used if no match is found for a requesting SHAR in the union of the site ARP and the applicable user ARP. It is recommended that an extremely minimal set of information be released to the no.other.match SHAR. Note that the site ARP is never evaluated alone, and must always be interpreted in the context of a particular user. If there is no SHAR/URL combination specified by the user or site ARP that matches those in the request, the default is always used.
ARP: admin
SHAR: no.other.match (default)
URL: *
ATTR: eduPersonAffiliation
SHAR: shar.osu.edu
URL: http://www.osu.edu/research
ATTR: eduPersonPrimaryName (include)
ATTR: eduPersonAffiliation filter: employee
SHAR: shar.mit.edu
URL: http://*.mit.edu
ATTR: eduPersonPrimaryName (exclude)
eduPersonAffiliation will be released to any SHAR that is not defined in either the admin or applicable user ARP.
Requests from shar.osu.edu for the http://www.osu.edu/research tree will receive the valid eduPersonPrimaryName for any user; users cannot deny the release of this attribute or any values of this attribute in their own ARP's.
Employee will always be filtered from release for all users to shar.osu.edu at http://www.osu.edu/research, regardless of the user ARP; however, if and only if that user has some other value of eduPersonAffiliation defined in the directory, then that other value will still be released.
Requests from shar.mit.edu for any URL of the form http://*.mit.edu/* will never be released eduPersonPrimaryName. Users cannot release this attribute to this SHAR/URL combination.
User ARP's can only block or permit the release of specific attributes. For example, if a site maintains attributes A, B, and C, then the user must first define an ARP for attribute A. Then, the user proceeds to create a filter, to block the release of certain values of that attribute. However, a user cannot define an ARP such that all attributes but A should be released. Additionally, ARP's that are set as exclude by a site ARP cannot be modified by the user. The full details of the ARP's that are applicable to a principle can be discovered using the ArpUtil tool, although MyAA is more appropriate for individual users and should provide adequate functionality. Users may also see notes associated with ARP's, which may be used for functions such as "We have forced this release to allow your collaboration in Physics 202 with Brown University." Additionally, users may create notes to themselves here when specifying user ARP's.
The following example of the ARP's that would apply to the user parviz, as obtained using ./ArpUtil list parviz -acls. Only the user ARP is visible, although all applicable site ARP's will be evaluated for a request as well.
ARP: parviz
ACL: arpAcl{[+blk([INSERT]), +dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
SHAR: shar.cmu.edu
ACL: sharAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
URL: http://www.cmu.edu [edu, cmu, www]
ACL: resourceAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
EPPN
AFFILS filter: staff, faculty,
URL: http://www.cs.cmu.edu [edu, cmu, cs, www]
ACL: resourceAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
EPPN
SHAR: shar.mit.edu
ACL: sharAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
URL: http://*.mit.edu [edu, mit, *]
ACL: resourceAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
AFFILS
SHAR: shar.osu.edu
ACL:sharAcl{[+blk([ALL])]}{[]}
URL: *.edu [edu, *]
ACL: resourceAcl{[+blk([ALL])]}{[]}
AFFILS filter: staff, faculty, employee,
dousti has the permission to modify any entry except for the last SHAR and all information beneath it, which may be maintained only by blk.
The release of EPPN and eduPersonAffiliation is allowed to anything within the SHAR shar.cmu.edu and the URL tree http://www.cmu.edu/*, and eduPersonAffiliation values of only staff or faculty such that if eduPersonAffiliation contains student, faculty, employee, then only faculty will be released; if it is staff, faculty, then the value released will be staff, faculty; if it is employee, then the value will be null.
EPPN alone will be released to the URL tree http://www.cs.cmu.edu if and only if the querying SHAR is shar.cmu.edu.
Any URL of the form http://*.mit.edu behind the SHAR shar.mit.edu will be released the full eduPersonAffiliation of the principle and nothing more.
Any URL of the form *.edu behind the SHAR shar.osu.edu will only be released values of eduPersonAffiliation that are staff, faculty, or employee.
The ArpUtil tool is more powerful than the web interface and provides functionality the web interface does not. ArpUtil is part of the distribution and will by default be in /usr/local/shib/beta/.
These are the commands ArpUtil supports.
ArpUtil list <arp name> [-acls] This command will list all the ARP logic pertaining to the arp name principle.
ArpUtil add <arp name> [-admin] <shar name> [-default] <url> <attribute name> [-exclude] [-filter [!]<val1> [!]<val2> ...] This command will create a new ARP for a given SHAR, URL tree, and attribute name, or add to an existing ARP if specified.
ArpUtil remove <arp name> [<shar name> [<url> [<attribute name>]]] This command will remove a given ARP, or parts of an ARP instead if specified.
ArpUtil setAcl <user> <acl> <arp name> [<shar name> [<url>]] This command will alter the ACL for a given ARP object.
These are the options associated with the various ArpUtil commands in alphabetical order.
acl This specifies the ACL to be applied. ACL's currently take the form of username.
-acls Provides a more detailed ARP list, including ACL information for each object.
-admin Used to modify the site ARP. Site ARP's are applicable to all principles referenced by an AA.
arp name Provides the a name for the ARP. This can be arbitrarily specified, but will be used in future modifications to the ARP.
attribute name The attribute name for which the ARP is valid. This must match the representation of the attribute within the AA logic.
-default This option negates the SHAR name and makes the ARP valid for all SHAR's. Valid only for -admin.
-exclude This option specifies that this ARP must be followed and cannot be superceded. Valid only for -admin.
-filter This defines the filter that will be applied to the attribute value when evaluating an ARP. An attribute value will be permitted for release if it is val1, etc., but if the ! modifier is specified, then the filtered value will not be released even if it is part of the attribute value. See the above examples for use cases.
shar name Provides the SHAR with which the ARP should be associated, e.g. shar.mit.edu.
url The URL tree for which the ARP is valid. All *'s are treated as valid wildcards, and entered URL's are assumed to terminate with *. Otherwise, the URL must be properly formed.
user This specifies which user's ARP objects will be modified.
This section applies primarily to the technical details of MyAA. For basic information on MyAA, please refer to section 4.f.
MyAA is intended to allow for a simple, web-based interface for users to modify their own ARP's. There is functionality ArpUtil supports that MyAA does not; for example, SHAR's are masked. Users currently login simply by entering their name, and the following page will allow modification of ARP's for the logged-in user. The following options are available from the webpage once the user is logged in:
Add New Resource This will pull up a new page which will allow a user to specify a new ARP:RESOURCE within an existing ARP:SHAR. Resource URL is the URL tree for which the ARP is valid. All *'s are treated as valid wildcards, and entered URL's are assumed to terminate with *. The attributes that may be released and the values that this attribute may contain are displayed, and a checkbox is provided. If the box is checked, the attribute will be released; if not, it will be explicitly prohibited from release.
This cannot override existing ARP's that are set exclude or include.
Delete Entire ARP This will delete all ARP's associated with a user that the user is permitted to delete based on ARP ACL's.
Delete Resource This will delete an ARP that applies to the user if the user is permitted to delete this ARP based on the ARP's ACL.
Edit Resource This will allow the resource to be edited using the same interface as is used to create new resources.
This section provides basic information about testing, logging, and error handling for Shibboleth origins. This information is not intended to be comprehensive, but instead rudimentary guidelines for basic configuration tests and problems. For more detailed information or answers to specific problems not addressed in this section, please mail mace-shib-users@internet2.edu with a thorough description of errors and configurations used.
Internet2 provides a basic target that can be used to test origin setup functionality. After your origin is recognized by Club Shib, simply use any browser to access https://wayf.internet2.edu/shibboleth/sample.jsp. Select your origin's name and follow the login process as a user would. Note that SSL must be used, and both the HS and AA must be fully configured.
The test target will then display a simple page which includes the basic information sent to it by your origin and the authentication rules it is using.
For information regarding specific error messages that may be generated if the origin does not work successfully, please refer to section 6.c.
Shibboleth's origin components log various operations which may prove useful for auditing, testing, and security purposes. This data is sent through log4j's standard mechanism with a log level of INFO. The location of the log file, the level at which the log is output, the formatting of the logs, and many more options may be configured by editing /WEB-INF/conf/log4j.properties. By default, it is setup to log to the console of the servlet container, with a level of WARN, but there is also a commented out example in the file to give a possible alternate configuration.
Shibboleth origins have not yet been sufficiently widely deployed in diverse environments to identify problems commonly encountered. At this point, please mail mace-shib-users@internet2.edu with any questions or problems encountered for answers to specific issues. As a knowledge base grows, this section will be developed.