

The SWITCHpki RA Operator

Role and responsibilities



SWITCH

SWITCHpki Team
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
Structure of SWITCHpki

- A **Public Key Infrastructure** for the Swiss higher education system (universities, federal institutes of technology, universities of applied sciences)
- Based on two main components:
 - The **Certification Authority (CA)**, which encompasses the technical infrastructure for issuing certificates
 - The **Registration Authority (RA)**, which is responsible for checking and confirming the correctness of certificate requests
- CA operations is outsourced to commercial suppliers (*QuoVadis*)
- RA is run by SWITCH *and* the participating organizations (by signing the agreement, the organizations become [Sub-]RAs)

SWITCHpki service concept

Technical components

Organisational components



Available types of certificates (1)

Server Certificates

- Business SSL
 - For generic SSL/TLS enabled applications: Web servers (HTTP), directory servers (LDAP), Mail servers (IMAP, POP, SMTP), AAI (Shibboleth), RADIUS servers, ...
 - Available with 1-, 2- or 3-year validity
 - Up to 50 DNS names allowed
- Extended Validation (EV) SSL
 - Recommended in particular for Web sites for “human” visitors, and where sensitive data is transmitted (e.g. IdP login page, HR admin database or similar)
 - Available with 1- or 2-year validity
 - Up to 20 DNS names allowed

Available types of certificates (2)

User Certificates



- Advanced Personal Certificates
 - For e-mail signing/encryption and web client authentication
 - Available to persons (if offered by your organisation at all)
 - Provided as soft-token certificate (installed on client)
 - Not suitable for signing PDF documents (requires hard-token certificate)
 - Validity up to 3 years

Server Certificates: Validation Types



- **DV: Domain validated** (*not available in SWITCHpki*)
 - Validation via e-mail exchange with contact listed in Whois record, or validation via evidence on website or in DNS records of domain
 - Weak validation
- **OV: Organization validated** (*Business SSL certificate*)
 - Validation of existence of organization (via Commercial Registry, law, contract, etc.)
 - Strong validation (repeated every 3 years)
- **EV: Extended validation** (*Extended Validation (EV) SSL certificate*)
 - Extended validation of existence of organization (via Commercial Registry, law, contract, etc.), including validation of Person's roles, phone numbers, etc.
 - Extra strong validation (repeated every year)

"Standard" (OV) SSL vs. EV SSL

Firefox




Internet Explorer



<https://evct.ssl.switch.ch/>


The QuoVadis CA certificate hierarchy (1)

Server Certificates



The QuoVadis CA certificate hierarchy (2)

User Certificates



QuoVadis root certificate preinstallation

- Operating systems

- Microsoft Windows (XP and later)
- Apple OS/X (10.2/Jaguar and later)
- All major Linux distributions
- iPhone OS (2.0 and later)
- Android (1.6 and later)
- Windows Phone 7

Well supported

- Applications/Toolkits

- Microsoft Internet Explorer (5.0 and later), Microsoft Outlook
- Firefox (1.0.2 and later), Thunderbird (1.0.2 and later), ...
- Google Chrome
- Apple Safari (1.0 and later)
- Opera (9.26 and later)
- Sun JDK/JRE (1.4.2_22/1.5.0_20/1.6.0_15 and later)
- Adobe Acrobat (versions 9.x and later)

The SWITCHpki RA operator...

- Is the central point of contact at an organization for PKI related inquiries (for employees/students of this organization as well as for SWITCH)
- Is typically a member of the IT department staff, should have at least one substitute
- Is expected to be familiar with PKI basics, SSL/TLS and X.509 certificates
- Is aware of the CP/CPS and related documents
- Has the authority to approve or reject a request for a certificate for his own organization (subject with O=...)
- Will be blamed (and his organization held liable) if he has approved a fraudulent request

RA operator duties

- Determine if the applicant is entitled to request a certificate (employee/student of the organization?)
- Check that the submitted request is legitimate/genuine
- For user certificates: make sure that a valid copy of an official photo identity document (passport, ID card) is submitted together with the request
- Keep an archive of those documents which are not forwarded to SWITCH (e.g. copies of internal e-mail correspondence, for Sub-RAs under the RA Bulk model also copies of photo ID documents etc.)
- For RA operators with admin certificates: properly secure the access to the private key (protect with passphrase)

The subject of a certificate request

- The subject is the most important part of a certificate signing request (CSR), together with the requested entries for the subjectAltName extension
- The subject DN (Distinguished Name) is composed of multiple attributetype-value pairs called RDNs (Relative Distinguished Names):

`C=CH, O=Universite de Geneve, CN=idp.unige.ch`

`C=CH, O=Haute Ecole Specialisee de Suisse occidentale (HES-SO), CN=pwlan.hefr.ch`

`C=CH, O=Universita della Svizzera Italiana, CN=login.unisi.ch`

- Common RDNs include *countryName (C)*, *stateOrProvinceName (ST)*, *localityName (L)*, *organizationName (O)*, *organizationalUnitName (OU)*, *commonName (CN)*
- Subject and subjectAltName entries **must be carefully checked** by the RA operator before any approval

Checking a request

- Many checks are already applied when a CSR is submitted through the form on www.switch.ch
 - Parameters of the key (only RSA keys are accepted)
 - Key size (either 2048 or 4096 bits)
 - Exponent > 65536
 - No known weak keys (CVE 2008-0116 aka Debian OpenSSL)
 - Subject DN: at least a CN attribute with a “proper” FQDN
 - Domains of requested FQDNs and e-mail address syntax
 - Correct ASN.1 encodings (causes warnings only)
 - EV SSL eligibility (per organization and domain)
 - Supported vs. unsupported RDNs (e.g. *description*, *unstructuredName*)
- The ***organizationalUnitName* (OU=)** attribute can’t be checked in an automated way (against a list of known acceptable values), so it **needs manual verification by the RA operator**

In short

- For request confirmation, SWITCHpki depends on RA operators at each participating organization
- Careful verification of the requested subject DN and subjectAltName entries is a crucial step before approving any SWITCHpki certificate request
- It's the responsibility of each participating organization to make sure that no bogus requests are approved by its RA operators (can be held liable otherwise)
- RA operators are the cornerstone for assuring the quality of SWITCHpki certificates